This paper examines industrialization policy in two oil giant economies, Indonesia and Nigeria. What are the key features of continued economic divergence in these two countries since the 1980s? It shows that Indonesia's policy-makers adopted a series of liberalization measures and switched to an export-oriented strategy to develop manufacturing industries from the mid-1980s, while Nigeria's policy-makers was reluctant to do so. This paper also seeks to understand the rationale behind the different policy choices. This paper argues that policy-makers' experience and educational background are possible explanation to the different industrialization policies in these two countries. Keywords: Industrialization; Indonesia; Nigeria; Policy-Maker
Introduction
Indonesia and Nigeria are two oil rich countries, which share similarities in many respects. Both are located in a tropical area, have very large and ethnically diverse population, experienced a long history of colonial rule, and are notorious for their high level of corruption. Both countries were ruled by military leaders from 1966 to 1998 (with two brief civilian administrations in Nigeria in 1979-1983 and 1993) . Despite these similarities, they show a stark contrast in economic performance. In the wake of independence, in the 1960s, Nigeria was full of optimism about the future of the economy. However, like a tragedy, up to the end of the 1990s the economy grew very slow and often grew at a negative rate, while two thirds of the population lived below the poverty line and inequality increased considerably. By contrast, after years of pessimism and chaos in the early 1960s, like a miracle, Indonesia's economy grew continuously at an average annual rate of 7 per cent and experienced rapid poverty reduction.
Industrialization has been regarded as a major factor contributing to divergent economic developments in Asia and Africa. This has also been a feature of Indonesia-Nigeria comparisons since the 1980s 1 . Since the mid-1980s, the manufacturing In Indonesia and Nigeria, manufacturing performance diverged significantly starting from the early 1980s, when oil prices began to drop. Even though both countries changed their industrialization strategy during this period from an import-substitution strategy to an export-promotion strategy, there were significant differences between these two countries. In the early 1980s, Indonesia's policymakers implemented a series of economic liberalization measures. This liberalization was sustained and even increased gross capital formation in Indonesia, when the state could no longer rely on oil revenues. Nigeria's policy-makers, in contrast, failed to improve gross capital formation in the economy with their half-hearted economic reform measures. In fact, investment policies in these two economies also differed significantly during this period. During the oil boom period in the 1970s, the governments in both countries adopted nationalistic inward-looking policies, and an import-substitution strategy. After the end of the oil boom in the early 1980s, Indonesia's policy-makers clearly wanted to stimulate more domestic private investment as well as FDI. In contrast, Nigerian policy-makers were still reluctant to provide more room for private and foreign participation.
This paper aims to understand why Indonesian policy-makers opted for a switch to export-oriented economic development and poverty alleviation in Indonesia was attributed to a pronounced rural-agricultural bias in development spending. Meanwhile, the poor economic result in Nigeria was due to neglect of the rural-agricultural sector.
industrialization since the 1980s, while Nigerian policy-makers were reluctant to do so. There are several studies attempt to explain the economic divergence by examining the historical and institutional contexts in the two countries (see for instance Bevan et al. 1999; Kohli 2004; Eifert et al. 2002; Lewis 2007 ; and Thorbecke 1998). According to Bevan, Indonesia historically had a greater export orientation and there was more smuggling between the islands outside Java and neighbouring countries (Bevan et al. 1999, p. 419). These conditions made an outward orientation in Indonesian economic policies more acceptable to policymakers. Kohli (2004, p. 327) argues that failure in Nigeria's industrialization can be traced back to the colonial period, in which 'British "effortless" colonialism laid the foundation of a distorted state and a commodity-dependent economy'. In the postcolonial period, Nigeria has indeed been an ineffective state, characterized by a personalistic and ethnically fragmented political elite, combined with an army and bureaucrats that are not competent, and lack of long-term vision (Kohli 2004, pp. 363-4) . The state's ineffectiveness, lacking the vision and organizational capacity to promote industrialization, is thus argued to have contributed to Nigeria's development failures. Meanwhile, Eiffert et al. (2002) , Thorbecke (1998) and Lewis (2007) emphasize how policy-makers in Nigeria were divided along communal and factional lines, and concludes that this made a problem of collective action. Moreover, patronage, clientelism, ethnic division, rent seeking, and conflict over welfare distribution led the country astray (Lewis 2007, pp. 77-8) . Different to the previous studies, in this study shows the importance of personal background and life experience of policy-makers in shaping development in Indonesia and Nigeria, which has received very little attention in the existing literature. It argues that policy-makers' experience and educational background are possible explanation to the different industrialization policies in these two countries.
This paper first briefly presents the importance of policy-makers' backgrounds to shape their policies.
It then provides an overview of industrialization policies in Indonesia and Nigeria. This paper then presents short biographies of the policy-makers responsible for the industrialization policies in the two countries, to assess the relevance of their personal background to the policies they espoused. Personal background (family, regional origins, ethnicity, religion, education, as well as political and professional affiliation) of policy-makers is important for understanding how their opinions are formed and what kinds of policies they are likely to support. There are at least two reasons. First, a policy-maker is often obligated to serve the interests of their group. This obligation usually comes from the background that provides the elite a basis for holding and maintaining their power. A policymaker drawn from a political party is required to serve the party's interests. Similarly, a policymaker who make use of class or ethnic sentiments to gain political power will need to serve their constituents. Of course, this tendency also works in the reverse direction. Educational background, for example, brings with it community networks that are important in maintaining an elite's power. This is not only in terms of alumni networks of a school, but also intellectual networks that share similar belief systems, codes of conduct and a certain established behaviour. Such an intellectual network, also known as an epistemic community, may support the elite's choices in policy-making. This epistemic community can help to provide policy arguments, not only for the policy-maker, but also for the public. This community can serve as 'guardian angels' for the elite's policy choices.
Second, personal background may shape an elite's belief in certain values and ideas that they think suit them or their society (see also It should be realized, however, that having a certain social background is not a guarantee that an elite will act according to the interests predicted by that background. For instance, a policy-maker of rural origins will not automatically prefer ruralbiased policies. It depends on how the person perceives being of rural origin. It is possible that having childhood memories of growing up in rural areas will lead the policy-maker to prioritize development in rural areas. However, there is also the possibility that the policy-maker will perceive rural areas as 'backward', and therefore prioritize the development of 'modern' urban areas.
Examining the background of policy-makers does not imply denying their ability to change. Even though they learned attitudes about authority, development, morality and democracy in childhood, this does not mean that they cannot change. Life experience provides the possibility for policymakers to learn about the necessity of certain policy measures, about what kind of policy would be the 'right' or 'wrong' policy. A policy-maker can learn from success or failure of policies that have been implemented by themselves or by previous policy-makers. In Indonesia, experiencing the mismanaged economy in the 1950s and early 1960s, with disastrous consequences, provided important lessons for the policy-maker in Suharto's period not to commit similar mistakes. A 'shocking' experience provides a 'wake-up call' for a policymaker to be alert to possible consequences of their decision-making.
There is also an importance role of policy-makers' network. Parry (1969, p. 97) notes that the process of 'political socialization' is dynamic and therefore the outlook of members of an elite can change fundamentally during their careers. Close encounters with business professionals and international donors, for instance, may lead policy-makers to more practical decisions. Also, participation in national policy-making may bring members of an elite closer together, and inspire them with a spirit of togetherness within their circle, which may lead them to a new policy stance. Therefore, social networks and interrelationships are important to understand a policy-maker's knowledge, beliefs and behaviour. 'Differences in the way in which organizations are structured, as well as in the positions people oc- dition, Figure 3 shows that gross capital formation in Indonesia in 1980s and 1990s, prior to crisis, is more than 25 percent of GDP, compared to that in Nigeria which is about 10 to 15 percent lower.
In term of openness, Table 1 shows that, since the 1980s, the average rate of tariffs in Indonesia decreased substantially. In 1984, the average applied tariff rate in Indonesia was 37 percent. This decreased to 25.2 percent in 1989 and 19.4 percent in 1993. In Nigeria, however, the average applied tariff rate remained high, more than 30 percent, during the period of liberalization in the second half of the 1980s. Table 2 shows that capital expenditure allocated to the manufacturing sector as a proportion of total capital expenditure was much lower in Indonesia than in Nigeria. Even though it fluctuated, the participation of the Indonesian government in industry was relatively low. In the First Five-Year Development Plan, 1969-1974, the Indonesian government allocated 1.5 percent of capital expenditure to industrial development. During the oil boom in the 1970s, which increased government revenue, capital expenditure to industry also increased, reaching more than 7.5 percent. With decreasing oil prices in the world market and changing industrial policies, the proportion of capital expenditure to industry decreased. In Nigeria, by contrast, capital expenditure allocated to industry was relatively high.
In the Second National Development Plan (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) , the figure was only 5.7 percent. However, during the oil booms in 1975-1985, it increased to more than 11 percent of total capital expenditure. Moreover, after the adoption of the structural adjustment program (1986), industry's share of capital expenditure reached 25.3 percent in 1987 (Ekpo 1996, p. 237).
In Nigeria, the share of public investment in GDP in the 1980s was even higher than in the 1970s, while private investment nearly collapsed (Lewis 2007, p. 190) . According to Lewis, in the 1970s public investment averaged less than 7 percent of Nigeria's GDP, and in the 1980s it reached more than 10 percent; meanwhile private investment dropped from 15.9 percent in the 1970s to only 5.3 percent in the 1980s. Moreover, in 1988, public investment reached a remarkably high 88.8 percent of total investment in the country (Anyanwu et al. 1997 ). This contrasts with the situation in Indonesia, where private investment increased steadily from 14.5 percent of GDP in the 1970s to 17.9 percent in the 1980s and 20.9 percent in the 1990s (Lewis 2007, p. 190 ).
The growing participation of the private and the foreign sectors in Indonesia can also be seen in the changing structure of credit. After the financial liberalization of 1988, the share of credit from government banks decreased steadily, while the This section has shown the differential performance of manufacturing in Indonesia and Nigeria, particularly since the 1980s. Indonesia was more open to the world market economy than Nigeria, as seen in the inflows of FDI and in the tariff rates. In addition, the government's role in industry decreased steadily in Indonesia, while it did not decrease in Nigeria. There was a clear trend for higher private and foreign participation in Indonesia, while in Nigeria the government's role in the economy remained strong.
Industrialization Policies
Industrialization has been regarded by many development economists as a major path to achieving a faster rate of economic growth and a higher standard of living (Ghatak 2003) . Therefore, it is not surprising that policy-makers in newly-independent countries considered industrialization to be the best and fastest way to develop their country. This section shows how industrialization and FDI policies in Nigeria and Indonesia changed over time, due to both internal and external factors. In Indonesia, government intervention in industrialization rose or fell following changes in oil prices and changes in cabinet ministers. However, there was a clear trend for Indonesia's industrial policy through trade and investment liberalization. Nigeria, by contrast, had only begun to liberalize its economy in the mid-1980s. Moreover, during the liberalization period in the 1980s, there was still a reluctance to liberalize Nigeria's economy and reduce government intervention remained strong.
Industrialization Policy in Nigeria
In the early independence period, Nigeria's federal government continued the colonial policies of Britain to attract foreign investment to the country (Ukwu 1994 . During this early independence period, however, the Nigerian government had also started to turn to import-substituting industries and was convinced of the need to have an independent economy. The vigorous importsubstitution strategy was meant to reduce overdependence on imported products and to save foreign exchange reserves (Anyanwu et al. 1997, p. 36) .
In addition, the call for a broad-based nationalist movement was growing. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the opposition in the Federal House of Representatives in the First Republic, for instance, 'urged Nigeria to follow the example of India, Burma, Ceylon, Thailand, and Indonesia which had nationalized the Dutch companies and yet found that foreign investors "flock" to them' (Enuenwosu and Nemedia 1980, p. 7). Considering the constraints in human and material resources, the government decided not to opt for nationalization. However, nationalization later evolved into 'indigenization', or 'Nigerianization' of foreign companies.
During the oil boom in the 1970s Nigeria adopted nationalist policies toward foreign investment. In the Second National Development Plan (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) , the government had emphasized the need for the economy to be directed by Nigerians themselves. A desire to end foreign domination of the Nigerian economy was the main factor in the drive toward nationalist policies. In 1970, for instance, foreigners dominated 57.3 percent of manufacturing and processing industries, 100 percent of mining and quarrying industries, and 91.3 percent of building and construction industries ( Anyanwu et al. 1997, p. 39) . The Second National Development Plan stated that:
The uncompromising objective of rising economic prosperity in Nigeria is the economic independence of the nation and the defeat of neo- • Encouraging private-sector participation by privatizing government holdings in industry.
• Playing a catalytic role in establishing new core industries.
• Improving the regulatory environment.
• Improving the country's investment climate.
• Establishing a clear set of industrial priorities.
• Harmonizing industrial policies at federal, state and local levels of government (Federal Ministry of Industry and Technology 1992, p. 64).
However, the achievements of the SAP and the 1989 industrial policy were disappointing. Instead of increasing private investment, the share of public investment in GDP in the 1980s increased.
Industrialization Policy in Indonesia
In Indonesia, industrialization started with nationalist-protectionist measures. The spirit of nationalism was very intense during this period. Besides increasing government revenue from oil money, the rise of nationalist sentiment was also driven by dissatisfaction among the pribumi group, and ultimately resulted in the January 1974 riots. The tragedy, usually referred to as the Malari Incident, or simply Malari (Malapetaka Januari), was a series of large-scale anti-Japanese riots. These riots happened when Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Indonesia in January 1974. People were dissatisfied because of the Japanese and ethnic Chinese domination over the economy. In the riots, hundreds of cars were burned, shops looted, and a day later a dozen looters were killed (Robison 1986 In investment, the procedures for approval of foreign investments were simplified by reducing the number of required documents from 26 to 13, which cut processing time from more than six months to less than two months (Kuncoro and Resosudarmo 2006, p. 346). In May 1986, new investment policies were introduced: (1) foreign ownership was allowed up to 95 percent; (2) wider financial access for joint-venture investment; (3) investment licenses could be granted for up to 30 years; and (4) no VAT on imported capital (Prawiro 1998b, p. 384). In 1989 the Negative Investment List (DNI) replaced the Investment Priority List (DSP), which meant that investors could be involved in more than one economic sector (Prawiro 1998b, p. 385).
In the financial sector, the credit ceiling was eliminated for every bank, interest rates were liberalized, and taxes on interest, dividends, and royalties for deposits in foreign currency in stateowned banks were eliminated (Lewis 2007 Having graduated from Senior Civilian School During Yusuf's tenure, the government tried to establish several industries, such as fertilizers, cement and textiles. These were industries that were proposed by the economists, led by Widjojo Nitisastro, to support agricultural development and to meet the demand for domestic clothing. During the early period of the New Order, there was a challenge of high food prices and insufficient domestic food production. To increase production, fertilizers, pesticides and agriculture-supporting machinery were offered to farmers at subsidized prices.
To accelerate infrastructure development, such as irrigation, the cement industry was developed. The government also took an active role in meeting social needs, such as demand for clothing and building materials. During this period, besides its opendoor policy, the government was directly involved in industrialization through the development of stateowned enterprises.
In the 1970s, protectionist schemes such as KIK and KMKP 3 were also advocated by the economists, particularly those from the central bank (BI). BI officials, including Rahmat Saleh and Arifin Siregar, were generally close to the FEUI economists, not only professionally but also personally. Interestingly, among the economists' team, these BI officials had significant differences compared to the other team members, including Widjojo, Ali Wardhana and Sumarlin. In terms of education, they were not trained in the United States. Rahmat Saleh earned his bachelor's degree in economics from FEUI, while Arifin Siregar earned his Master's degree in the Netherlands and his doctor's degree in Germany..
It is interesting that the non-economist Soehoed, Minister of Industry from 1978 to 1983, was widely regarded as a forceful and articulate advocate of the socalled 'structural approach to industrialization', which advocated an active role for the state. During the New Order, Soehoed was associated with the CSIS (Centre of Strategic and International Studies) group, particularly with Sudjono Humardhani and Ali Murtopo, the main rivals of the FEUI economists in economic policy-making. It is true that Soehoed advocated a structural approach in development, such as introducing subcontracting and partnerships (bapak angkat) for smallscale industry in 1981 (Chalmers 1990 , p. 13). Soehoed stressed the importance of state-owned enterprises in developing basic industries:
It is evident that within private national enterprises, there are few companies currently able to become a partner of sufficient weight when facing multinational companies -apart from the state-owned enterprises. The size, staffing and 'stature' of the state-owned enterprises, apart from financial support of the government, clearly makes it the only entities that can compete with the multinational corporations today in the development of basic industries. (Soehoed 1982 , p. 55)
Soehoed was not against foreign investment, however. He believed foreign investment was needed to solve the problems of insufficient capital and inadequate technology. Increasing foreign investment in the late 1960s and early 1970s was partly due to the policy he implemented when he was on the Technical Team for Investment and the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM). When the 1974 Malari riots occurred, he was deputy chairman of BKPM, and was blamed for the growing foreign investment from Japan that dominated the domestic economy. Soehoed also strongly defended tax holidays for foreign investors, when the government wanted to delete this in 1971 (Soehoed 2001, p. 218) . His experience in the private sector, before joining the New Order government, seems to have influenced his ideological stance: the aim of increasing indigenous participation, while recognizing the need for foreign investment. Since 1978, when Soehoed became Minister of Industry, measures to increase private and foreign participation have never been fully abolished.
The process towards liberalization went further with the appointment of the fourth Development Cabinet in 1983. The new minister of industry, Hartarto Sastrosoenarto, understood that the government could no longer rely on oil money for industrialization. He believed there was an emergency situation that required inviting private participation in industrialization. Therefore, Hartarto said that deregulation was a necessary step to take before the private sector would be willing to step in. According to him, the private sector will step back if there is too much regulation, and therefore it is better not to have too much regulation, which may create a high-cost economy (Interview 28/11/2008).
Even though Hartarto did not get along very well with the FEUI economists, basically there was not much difference in their policy stance, particularly regarding deregulation measures. They agreed on the importance of creating a business climate that was conducive to industrialization. Interestingly, Hartarto was an engineer and a career bureaucrat in the Department of Industry before he occupied the top-level position in the department. He graduated as a chemical engineer from the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia, and has usually been portrayed as an opponent of the economists in policy-making. Hartarto's standpoint of advocating private participation seems to have come from his experience in managing several state-owned enterprises. 
Nigerian Policy-Makers
After independence, Nigeria's economic policy was liberal, allowing full foreign participation in the economy. However, the seed of economic nationalism had already grown during this period, pioneered by Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Awolowo, a Yoruba, was known as a leader of the Action Group, a political party. He also served as premier of the Western Region (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) . After Nigeria's independence, he led the opposition in the government, because his party lost the 1959 federal parliamentary elections. In 1962 he was tried and then jailed until the First Republic collapsed. Therefore, in the early days of independence, Awolowo did not have the opportunity to manage the Nigerian economy. However, when Gowon took power in 1966, Awolowo was released from prison and was invited to join the cabinet as federal commissioner of finance. He remained in this position until 1971, when the Biafran war ended. One of his legacies was his ability to manage Nigeria's finances throughout the costly civil war without borrowing a single kobo from foreign countries (Federal Ministry of Industry and Technology 1992, p. 274). In managing the economy, Awolowo was a typical 'fiscalist' or Keynesian economist, who believed in the use of fiscal policies to promote economic development (Bamisaye 2002, p. 376 In 1969 at the conference on National Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria, for preparing the Second National Development Plan, Asiodu presented Planning for Further Industrial Development in Nigeria. In this paper, he notes that in the industrial sector, foreign private investment had been dominant, and if the situation continued, it would lead to serious economic and political problems (Asiodu 1969, p. 14) . Therefore, he said:
It is imperative that Nigerians own some of the equity of the manufacturing firms and retain some of the profits. Politically the situation will be untenable if within a decade, when industry should be much more important, the bulk of the investments are held by foreigners and largely absentee owners. It is at this initial stage that a policy should be set in the mutual interest of investors and Nigerians allowing the latter to acquire a significant stake. (Asiodu 1969 , p. 14)
The desire for greater Nigerian participation in the economy grew stronger in the 1970s. In fact, the goal of economic nationalism was widely shared by most members of Nigeria's policy-makers. In the 1970s, there was almost no resistance from the policy-makers against the strong pressure for indigenization of foreign capital. The economic situation at that time, which was dominated by foreign companies, raised demands for more domestic participation. Therefore, the aspiration for greater participation was accommodated in the Second National Development Plan, and then realized in the 1972 Indigenization Decree. 
Conclusion
This paper has discussed the continued economic divergence between Indonesia and Nigeria in the early 1980s. In the 1970s, funded by increasing oil revenues, Indonesia and Nigeria both adopted an import-substitution strategy to develop industry. However, when oil revenue decreased, both countries had to alter their industrialization policies. Indonesian policy-makers adopted a series of liberalization measures for export-oriented industries. These changes not only maintained manufacturing performance, but also increased it. By the end of the 1980s, manufacturing had become the engine of exports of the Indonesian economy. Nigeria, with similar pressure on its balance of payments because of decreasing oil revenue, attempted to liberalize the economy through a structural adjustment program and alter the industrialization strategy to make it more export oriented. However, the structural adjustment was half-hearted. Sudden liberalization and inefficient devaluation put even more pressure on industry, which still very much relied on imported raw materials. In addition, Nigerian economic policy-makers during the period still believed in an active role of government in the economy. Instead of decreasing capital expenditures on industry, for instance, the government opted to increase it.
It is sometimes suggested that government intervention was an important factor behind the success of industrialization in Indonesia, and not merely the liberalization measures. This paper shows that there was nevertheless a significant reduction of the Indonesian government's role in the economy. It is not only that government capital expenditure allocated to industry was decreasing, but there was also an increasing role in industrial investment for private and foreign participation. Although Nigeria's economic problems are sometimes blamed on policy inconsistency as a result of elite fragmentation, on the issue of economic nationalism there was in fact strong and consistent agreement among political elites and technocrats alike. Among the policy-makers, there was a strong desire for national economic independence. There was not much room for liberal economists to influence Nigeria's economic management; the only time they had some room for manoeuvre was during the structural adjustment program, and that lasted less than four years. The nationalist economic views of Nigerian policy-makers contrasted with Indonesian policy-makers, who pragmatically liberalized the economy by relying on the market mechanism.
The educational background of policy-makers is a possible explanation of their ideology. Those who advocated nationalist-protectionist measures were usually those who were trained in Europe or in their home country. A similar phenomenon can be seen in Nigeria; those advocating protectionist measures were mainly educated in the United Kingdom and Nigeria. The 1970s policy-makers in Nigeria, such as Awolowo and Philip Asiodu, were trained in Europe. Europe's strong socialist tradition may have influenced their ideas of nationalism. Moreover, economic conditions at the time, when foreign companies dominated the Nigerian economy, led them to advocate nationalist measures. In the 1980s, there were not many changes in Nigeria's economic policy-makers. They were still fragmented and there were only a handful of trained economists in the economic policy arena. The advocates of economic reform through structural adjustment held posts only at the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning. The remaining economic policy-makers were not fully convinced by the liberalization agenda. Civil servants, for instance, were quite reluctant to carry out the reforms decided by the minister of finance as well as the president. Moreover, during the structural adjustment program, the economists did not stay long enough in the government to manage the reforms.
In Indonesia, by contrast, economic policy-making was controlled by US-trained economists who had been influenced by pragmatic liberal economic thinking. Moreover, not only those who were trained as economists advocated economic liberalization; but those with an engineering background also recognized the important role of private participation. Not only the economists, but the engineers as well, who were usually associated with state intervention in the economy, understood that they could no longer finance the protectionist measures and needed to invite private and foreign participation. This standpoint may have been strengthened by their direct experience with state intervention. For example, they had experienced the deregulation measures implemented in Indonesia in the 1960s and 1970s, such as devaluation, that improved the competitiveness of Indonesian products, and this experience may have made them less resistant to liberalization.
